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Abstract 
This paper examines the inflation targeting experience in developing countries. Based 
on panel data of 53 developing countries, of which 20 those have adopted inflation 
targeting policy by the end of 2007, the purpose is to show the effects of inflation 
targeting on macroeconomic performance in these economies. We use the Great 
Moderation approach of Pétursson (2005) to analyze the relationship between 
inflation targeting and macroeconomic performance over the period 1980-2012. A 
key lesson from this experience is that this monetary policy realizes macroeconomic 
performance and contributes to the reduction of inflation, especially in developing 
countries with hyperinflation.      
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the policy of inflation targeting (IT) is adopted as an alternative to 
the policy of targeting monetary aggregates or the exchange rate fixed. Practice of 
inflation targeting made his theory. The policy of inflation targeting was adopted 
without the inherent theory. The practice of this policy prior to his theory, which came 
in later: Svensson (1999, 2000), Walsh (1998), Woodford (2003). Due to tardiness of 
the theory of inflation targeting, many discussions have arisen. The recent debate has 
focused on the macroeconomic performance of the inflation targeting policy. New 
Zealand was the first country adopting inflation targeting in 1990. Although, 
economists have explained theoretically targeting inflation only from 1995 ( 
Leiderman and Svensson (1995), Svensson (1997), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and 
Bernanke and al. (1999)). This lack theoretical caused a reticence in some countries to 
the adoption of inflation targeting. 
During the 20th century, the number of countries that have adopted this monetary 
regime has increased. Twenty-six Central Banks use inflation targeting as a 
framework for monetary policy, while others countries, mainly developing countries 
in preparing for the implementation of the new monetary regime. Until the first half of 
the 1990s, inflation targeting was designed primarily to industrialized countries. 
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) 
and Landerrache and al.(2001) concluded that the adoption of inflation targeting is an 
opportunity for countries adopting this monetary regime. The work of Truman (2003), 
Levin and al. (2004) and IMF (2005) show that the adoption of inflation targeting is a 
necessity to ensure the credibility of monetary policy. By against, Capistrán and 
Ramaos-Francia (2006) point out some caveats about the efficiency of inflation 
targeting. In other works, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) show that the adoption 
of inflation targeting in emerging countries gives less satisfactory results than in 
developed countries, although the decline in the inflation rate is very remarkable after 
inflation targeting. In this context, Rose (2007) shows that inflation targeting can 
ensure long-term performance more remarkable than other monetary regimes.  
Ball and Sheridan (2005), using a cross-section differences-in-differences model, 
show that there is no long-term difference between the industrialized countries. They 
yield arguments against the positive effects of inflation targeting. Gonçalvas and 
Salles (2008) applied the method of Ball and Sheridan (2005) on a sample of 35 new 
countries adopting inflation targeting. The results of their research were similar to 
those of the IMF (2005). They find that inflation targeting leads to a decrease in the 
average inflation rate and reduce the volatility of GDP growth. In a new book recently 
published by the OECD, De Mello (2008) finds that the adoption of inflation targeting 
in emerging countries allows macroeconomic performance.  
In this respect, the results obtained in the majority of studies show that the monetary 
authorities in emerging economies are less attached to their goals of price stability. 
Inflation targeting in these economies is quite a difficult task because it is related to 
the unstable macroeconomic environment, like the fragility of institutions and lack of 
credibility of monetary policy. Views these shortcomings, developing economies have 
the challenge to acquire more credibility to ensure a price stability and sustainable 
economic growth. Indeed, the novelty of this regime (IT) consist to, on the one hand, 
the explicit commitment to consider inflation as the primary goal of monetary policy 
and on the other hand, the emphasis in is placed on the transparency and 
responsibility of the central bank. In addition, monetary authorities were aware of the 
success of this rule because the results were satisfactory for developed countries. This 
monetary rule requires several prerequisites structural and institutional as emerging 
markets could not ensure. 
Thus, in the literature, it appears that most of the results are different because of the 
wide variety of samples. Some samples include all industrialized countries, countries 
that adopt explicit targeting and those adopting implicit targeting. In addition, many 
other studies disagree on the dates of the actual adoption of (IT) or the methods used, 
which significantly affects the results. This variety in the samples, time or methods 
causes a lot of divergences in the discussions. 
The contradictions in the empirical work led us to look for, if inflation targeting 
contributes to macroeconomic performance. Indeed, the objective in this work is to 
obtain results in favor of the adoption of (IT).  
The purpose of this article is to examine whether inflation targeting affects the 
volatility of inflation and enhance economic growth. We also verify the effectiveness 
of this policy through the achievement of economic performance. Thus, we  hope  to  
achieve  two  goals  in  this work: one  is  to  contribute  to  the economic literature on 
the topic; and the other is to have a more reliable yardstick available before 
recommending that any Central Bank joins the inflation targeting framework. Our 
empirical technique recently used by economists in the case of the theory of inflation 
targeting in developed countries. Indeed, we have adopted the Great Moderation 
approach of Pétursson (2005) that address one methodology well known in the 
literature. Than by using panel data, we test the effect of inflation targeting while 
controlling for the “Great Moderation”. The most  important advantage, “Great 
Moderation” approach gives us information about the stability of inflation and growth 
in  developing countries that have adopted (IT) by  the end of 2007 (called ITers or  
treatment  group)  and non  ITers (or control  group). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two present the 
econometric methodology and introduces the dataset. Section three shows the 
estimation results. Section four is devoted to the discussion. Finally, we conclude. The 
paper has additional tables in the appendices. 
 
2. Empirical study 
 
We try to establish empirical studies that allow providing robust answers to show the 
important role of (IT) framework to enhance economic growth and stabilize the 
volatility of inflation. Our focus is to analyze the relationship between (IT) framework 
and economic performance.  
Empirical research is headed by factors: 
-Work addressing the relationship between the volatility of inflation rate, the growth 
and inflation targeting in developing countries, are rare. Then, the conduct of 
monetary policy in industrialized countries differ in developing countries either by the 
operational and institutional frameworks of central banks in the presence of inflation 
targeting or different level of financial development. 
-We follow a panel methodological approach in examining these issues. Most studies 
that have addressed this issue have been based on individual analyzed using time 
series analysis. A panel analysis provides some advantages. This method can 
distinguish two groups of countries, treatment group and control group (Ball and 
Sheridan (2004), Pétursson (2004)). 
 
2.1. Econometric methodology and data 
To study the impact of inflation targeting on macroeconomic performance, we use the 
Great Moderation approach of Pétursson (2005) that address one methodology well 
known in the literature. In this work, the focus will be on the developing countries, 
because empirical studies dealing the case of these economies are rare and the results 
are sometimes contradictory. To test the effect of inflation targeting on 
macroeconomic performance, we evaluate its effect on inflation, output growth and 
their volatilities in developing economies.  
For robustness reasons, our empirical study is based on the use the methodology of 
Pétursson (2005). He uses panel data analysis. To do that the following panel model is 
estimated for the sample of N inflation targeting countries. 
πit = αit + βπ IT it + γ π  πit-1  +  µπ yit-1+ δ0πtw + δ 1πwit-1 + ξ πit .         (1) 
 i= 1….N, t =1,…,T. 
Where πit is inflation in inflation targeting country i at time t, yit is output growth in 
inflation targeting country i at time t, αit is the constant, πtw is the average inflation 
rate of a group of non-inflation targeting developing economies. This variable 
controls for the general evolution of the inflation level and IT it is a dummy variable 
which equals one from the first quarter after the adoption of inflation targeting and 
zero otherwise. The model also includes lagged on inflation to account for a possible 
bias due to potential correlation between the dummy variable and past inflation 
performance.  
An alternative estimation approach is to include the non-inflation target countries in 
the sample group and to approximate the global disinflation trend with a time trend 
polynomial, λπ(t). The trend polynomial replacing πtw. In this case the inflation target 
countries can be thought of as the “treatment group” and the non-inflation target 
countries as the “non-treatment group”.  
πit =   αit +  βπ IT it + γ π πit-1  +  µπ yit-1 + λπ(t) + ξ πit  .                       (2) 
i= 1….N + M, t =1,….,T. 
Where, the country sample includes N inflation targeting countries and a control 
group of M – N countries. Hence, equation (2) is re-estimated with the trend 
polynomial.  
In order to confirm if IT really delivers a performance macroeconomic, we estimate 
the following equation: 
yit = αyi + βy IT it + γyyit-1 +  µy rit-1 + φye it-1+ δy0yitw + δy1ywit-1 + ξyit .   (3) 
 i = 1…………N; t =1,….,T. 
Where yit output growth in inflation targeting country i at time t, rit is the real interest 
rate in inflation targeting country i at time t, eit is the real exchange rate in inflation 
targeting country i at time t (a rise in eit denotes an appreciation) and ytw is average 
output growth in non-targeting developing countries and ITit is a dummy variable 
which equals one from the first quarter after the adoption of inflation targeting and 
zero otherwise.  
We define another model which includes all emerging markets. Just as in previous 
equation the averages ytw and ywit-1 are replaced with a time trend δy (t). 
yit =   αyi +  βy IT it + γyyit-1 +  µy rit-1 + φye it-1+ δy (t) +  ξyit .                (4) 
i = 1….N +M; t =1,….,T. 
 
2.2. Data and estimates 
By using panel data, we test the effect of inflation targeting while controlling for the 
“Great Moderation” for the period 1980:1-2012:2, using different country samples. 
For robustness reasons, different country samples are being used. The first country 
sample includes all the 20 inflation targeting countries. The second sample includes 
the 11 countries that had adopted inflation targeting prior to 2002. The third sample 
includes the 6 countries that had adopted inflation targeting prior to 2002 and had 
inflation on average below 25% in the 1980s. The fourth sample includes the 3 
countries that had adopted inflation targeting prior to 2002 and had inflation on 
average below 15% in the1980s. The final sample includes the 4 countries that had 
adopted inflation targeting prior to 2002 and had an average inflation above 50% in 
the 1980s. We employ inflation that is measured as quarterly percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and GDP growth rates from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). For missing data we used the annual base given by the 
World Bank. We estimate the average volatility of inflation and output growth  (the 
volatility of inflation or output growth is calculated as the standard deviation from the 
average). 
Our dataset consists of 53 developing countries examined over the period 1980-2012. 
The sample is composed of 20 developing countries that have adopted IT by  the end 
of 2007 (called ITers or  treatment  group)  and  33  non  ITers (or control  group) (see 
table A in appendix) . 
For purpose of comparability, our sample relies on Lin and Ye (2009) and Roger 
(2009). The developing countries category considered here refers to the World Bank 
classification, thus includes both low-income countries and emerging-market 
countries. Accordingly, we estimate treatment effect of IT upon macroeconomics 
variables by the chosen conservative starting dates of IT. Because effect  of  IT  upon  
our variables  is driven  by  the  chosen starting  dates  of  IT (see table 1).  
 
3. Estimation results 
3.1. Effects on average inflation  
Table 1 contains the estimations of equation (1) and (2) for every country sample.   
The effects of IT are considered statistically significant for all groups of countries 
emerging even for countries that have experienced hyperinflation since the 80s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Estimation of the effects of inflation targeting on inflation. 
Estimation equation (1) and (2). 
Dependant variable: Inflation rate   
 All emerging 
market 
economies 
with an 
inflation 
targeting 
regime [1] 
Adoption 
prior to 
2002 
[2] 
Adoption 
prior to 2002 
and average 
inflation 
below 25% 
in 1980s [3] 
Adoption 
prior to 2002 
and average 
inflation 
below 15% in 
1980s [4] 
Adoption 
prior to 2002 
and average 
inflation 
above 25% in 
1980s [5] 
 Eq.1     Eq.2 Eq.1     Eq.2 Eq.1     Eq.2 Eq.1      Eq.2 Eq.1    Eq.2 
      
 Constant 
 
πt-1  
 
 
2.18        4.6** 
(1.11)    (1.3) 
0.65      0.66** 
(0.34)     (0.41) 
0.90      1.12 
(0.34) (0.56) 
0.861    1.07 
(0.03) (0.02) 
1.24        1.63    
(0.13)   (0.24) 
0.44        0.40  
(0.03)   (0.04) 
0.75          0.65 
(0.1)       (0.19) 
0.58**  0.47** 
(0.04)     (0.05)  
11.88      12.62 
(3.79)      (6.8) 
-0.18*** 0.03*  
(0.17)     (0.19) 
yt-1 0.53      0.21** 
(0.5)    (0.03) 
 
0.008 -0.143 
(0.02) (0.02) 
-0.39***  0.5 
(0.01)   (0.01) 
 
0.012**  0.01* 
(0.06)     (0.06) 
0.69    0.37*** 
(0.19)     (0.22) 
πt
w
 0.98             
(1.0)        
0.2              
(0.07)  
0.16              
(0.07)  
0.29            
(0.08)  
0.12          
(0.11)  
π
w
t-1 -2.71         
(1.05)  
-0.18          
(0.07) 
-0.12             
(0.08)  
-0.32           
(0.05)  
-0.09        
(0.19)  
      
IT Dummy 
 
Time trend 
-2.32* -2.6*** 
(1.05)       (1.7) 
                 1.19 
               (1.03) 
-0.71  -0.08 
(0.45) (0.54)            
      -0.09*** 
           (0.08) 
-0.48**-0.19* 
(0.15)   (0.22) 
         0.015** 
             (0.03) 
-0.463   -0.291 
(0.12)    (0.14) 
              -0.01* 
            (0.001)            
-11.8*   4.67** 
(0.17)     (6.56) 
              -0.07* 
            (0.12) 
R2 
Observations 
Wald test   (Chi2) 
P- Value 
0.87        0.86 
1510      1473   
401.5      391.6 
0.000      0.000 
0.997   0.99 
964        949 
3197.3 3983 
0.000  0.000 
0.90        0.83 
486          479 
159.06  154.8 
0.000    0.000 
0.99         0.99 
332          328 
288.33    298.8 
0.000      0.000 
0.97          0.95 
370           364 
120.02    453.2 
0.000      0.000 
Source:   Author’s estimations.  
- Numbers in parenthesis are standards errors. 
*,**,*** respectively denote significance at the 1%,5 % and 10 % levels. 
[1] 20 inflation targeting countries, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Indonesia,  Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines,  Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, 
Turkey, Guatemala, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ghana. 
[2] The second sample includes the 11 countries, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, South Korea and Thailand. 
[3] The third sample includes the 6 countries, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, South Africa, South 
Korea and Thailand. 
[4]The fourth sample includes the 3 countries,  South Africa, South Korea and Thailand. 
[5]The final sample includes the 4 countries, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, Peru and Poland. 
 
Estimates for the inflation targeting dummy are generally negative, however, rarely 
significant. Significant results can only be reported in the country sample of countries 
with average inflation levels below 25 per cent in the 1980s. In addition we report that 
the inflation level is rarely significant, and is only really felt in countries with below 
15 percent average inflation in the 1980s. Estimates of equation (2), the results 
suggest that the adoption of IT has reduced the average inflation in the first sample. 
Dummy coefficient is negative and insignificant, which has an ambiguous effect on 
the impact of the adoption of inflation targeting policy on the level of inflation, which 
explains Siklos (1999) and Brito and Bystedlt (2010). In the same context Gonçalves 
and Salles (2008) argue that hyperinflation is a very distinct phenomenon from 
moderate inflation and therefore can be treated differently. Dummy coefficient is 
negative and insignificant threshold. These results show that the inflation volatility 
increased sharply during periods of crises in developing markets. 
After the crisis period Asian crisis, Mexican crisis and currency crisis, the coefficient 
of dummy is positive and significant, indicating that the adoption of IT has reduced 
the volatility of inflation; this is consistent with the work of Lin and Ye (2009). 
In the last sample, the effects on inflation targeting on inflation are found to be 
statistically significant. These findings are similar to the findings of other studies, 
such as Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) and Truman (2003). However, Ball and 
Sheridan (2005) argue that countries have adopted the IT because the inflation rate is 
very high before adoption of this monetary regime. 
 
3.2. Effects on output growth 
The estimation of the equation of the volatility of output growth, the coefficient is 
positive and significant at 10% levels. These results confirm the work Mollik and al. 
(2008). They showed that the IT has a positive effect on economic growth.  
Dummy coefficient is negative and insignificant, which shows that the adoption of IT 
is not relevant for the improvement of economic growth during two periods. 
The majority of studies have interpreted the targeting of inflation as a strict monetary 
rule (see Gonçalves and Salles (2008) and Lin and Ye (2009)). Some work argues that 
the inflation targeting can be harmful for the growth (see Friedman and Kuttner 
(1996)). Pétursson (2005) confirms these arguments showing the average growth 
performance in targeting countries. The growth has fallen slightly on average after 
inflation targeting. This is however reversed when the hyperinflation countries are 
excluded. 
The main results are reported in table 2. The positive effects of inflation targeting on 
output growth is significant in country groups including hyperinflation countries and 
in countries adopting the inflation target prior 2002.  
In other works there is no evidence suggesting that inflation targeting has harmed 
growth (see Ball and Sheridan (2005) and Truman (2003)). Pétursson (2005), 
compare fluctuations in output growth before and after inflation targeting. He seems 
that growth variability has decreased in general after the adoption of inflation 
targeting, with largest gain in emerging countries. 
Than, the significant coefficient states that inflation targeting had a negative effect in 
countries with an average inflation rate under 15 and 25 percent in the 1980s. The 
negative effect can be explained by periods of disinflation were initiated by the 
beginning of the inflation target regime, resulting in lower or negative growth as the 
case of these countries: South Africa, South Korea and Thailand. These countries 
have adopted targeting with low levels of inflation.  
The exchange rate and the interest rate generally yield insignificant results, as 
expected. These findings confirm the studies of Pétursson (2005), who concluded that 
inflation targeting has led to fall in nominal interest rate. 
It is however appropriate to keep in mind, as pointed out by Ball and Sheridan (2005), 
that any effects of this new regime on growth are likely to take some time to emerge. 
The history of inflation targeting is therefore probably too short to give a definite 
answer on the link between inflation targeting and economic growth, even in the 
countries with the longest targeting history. 
 
Table 2. Estimation of the effects of inflation targeting output growth. 
Estimation equation (3) and (4). 
Dependant variable: Output growth   
 All emerging 
market 
economies 
with an 
inflation 
targeting 
regime 
Adoption 
prior to 
2002 
Adoption 
prior to 
2002 and 
average 
inflation 
below 25% 
in 1980s 
Adoption 
prior to 2002 
and average 
inflation 
below 15% in 
1980s 
Adoption 
prior to 
2002 and 
average 
inflation 
above 25% 
in 1980s 
 Eq.3   Eq.4 Eq.3   Eq.4 Eq.3   Eq.4 Eq.3   Eq.4 Eq.3   Eq.4 
 Constant 
 
yit-1  
 
 
2.41      4.3 
(1.29)   (1.7) 
0.16*  0.31** 
(1.3)   (0.8) 
1.78   4.05** 
(1.59)  (1.96) 
0.24* 0.23** 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
2.34*5.09**    
(1.4)    (1.75) 
-0.24*   -0.25  
(0.04)  (0.04) 
3.38**     8.93 
(1.59)     (2.18) 
-0.56      -0.57  
(0.045)   (0.04)  
4.66**   9.24* 
(2.06)  (3.66) 
-0.39      0.37 
(0.06)  (0.06)  
rit-1 
 
ytw 
 
yt-1w 
0.087    0.62 
(0.2)   (0.31) 
0.47**          
-(1.19) 
-0.54*          
(1.04) 
0.015     0.14 
(0.001)(0.02) 
0.32**         
(0.27)   
-0.07           
(0.14)   
 
-0.05*  0.03 
(0.06)  (0.01) 
0.56           
(0.62)   
-0.03          
(0.27)   
 
 
0.062** 0.01*  
(0.091)   (0.06) 
0.49*             
(0.34)   
-0.09            
(0.18)   
 
0.01       0.37 
(0.01) (0.22) 
0.39*           
(0.16)   
-0.1*             
(0.35)   
 
eit-1 0.089   -0.04 0.025    -0.02 0.08     -0.05 0.013    0.36* 0.02     0.021 
 (0.32)  (1.28) (0.015)(0.05) (0.012)(0.01) (0.04)    (1.04) (0.017)(0.01) 
IT Dummy 
 
Time trend 
-2.73* -2.11* 
(0.41)    (0.7) 
           0.05** 
              (0.9) 
-2.58*-1.2** 
(0.76)(1.035) 
        0.03*** 
            (0.07) 
-0.74    -0.06 
(0.78) ( 0.88) 
         -0.024* 
            (0.02) 
-1.44    -6.02* 
(1.08)     (1.05)     
-            -0.59 
              (0.03) 
-6.09* -3.52* 
(1.87)  (2.58) 
       -0.06*** 
              (0.04)
R2 
Observations 
Wald test   (Chi2) 
P- Value 
0.86      0.82 
1263     1356   
864      851 
0.000   0.000 
0.97       0.96 
884         866 
1046     1053 
0.000   0.000 
0.42       0.79 
730        562 
39           43 
0.000   0.000 
0.64         0.52 
328           408 
158           178 
0.000      0.000 
0.99       0.97 
341         357 
595         599 
0.000   0.000 
Source:   Author’s estimations 
- Numbers in parenthesis are standards errors 
*,**,*** respectively denote significance at the 1%,5 % and 10 % levels. 
  
 
4. Discussion 
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy of inflation 
targeting. This topic has been the subject of many economic debates. In our study, we 
have tried to provide some robust answers to some ambiguous question so far. Based 
on various studies, we proposed a very recent approach in the economic literature: the 
method of Great Moderation of Pétursson (2005). We have shown that inflation 
targeting is relevant for developing economies. This same method was used by the 
same economists in the case of 20 OECD countries but the results are totally 
contradictory. 
Our work has shown shortcomings. The regime of inflation targeting based on certain 
institutional conditions (such as the independence of the Central Bank and solid 
performance systems, and stable economic structures (Pétursson (2009)) and Hove 
(2010)). The choice of macroeconomic variables is limited to the volatility of 
inflation, the rate of economic growth. Other studies, (Kim and Beladi (2009) and 
Sachsida and al. (2003) and Al-Nasser and al. (2009), have taken into account the 
commercial independence of developing countries relative to the rest of the world 
which identifies the ability of the policy of inflation targeting to control the price 
change.  
The analysis of economic developments using this method in the case of developing 
countries lacks precision. Our methodology has not shown that the adoption of 
inflation targeting positively affects the dynamics of inflation. A new method is 
proposed, this is the method of evolutionary spectral analysis has been used by Ftiti.Z 
and Essadi.E (2013). This method is used to model inflation in a sample of four 
developed countries adopting inflation targeting. It can detect structural breaks in the 
series of inflation and which coincide with the economic facts (Ben Aissa, Boutahar 
and Jouini (2004)). 
Recently some studies have focused on the comparison of the effect of inflation 
targeting on macroeconomic performance (Ball and Sheridan (2005), and Vega and 
Vega and Winkelried (2005) and l’IMF (2005)). All these studies were based on the 
study on cross-section evidence, but they differ in the choice of control group of non 
targeters, and especially in the theoretical and econometric methods used. Than, the 
majority of studies have interpreted the targeting of inflation as a strict monetary rule 
(see Gonçalves and Salles (2006) and Lin and Ye (2009)). This study can be extended 
by studying other samples from different geographic areas. We can treat the case, for 
example, of the countries of Eastern Europe in order to have a more significant effect 
in our estimates. 
 
Conclusion 
In this work, we presented an empirical study to verify the relevance of the inflation 
targeting policy to ensure price stability in the case of developing countries. To this 
end, we applied the approach of "Great Moderation" of Pétursson (2005). 
We used panel data to study two groups in our sample: the treatment group and the 
control group the (ITers and non ITers group) to show the effect of the policy of 
inflation targeting on inflation and economic growth. The methodology we have 
followed in this work has given us important information about the relevance of the 
adoption of inflation targeting in developing countries and particularly in countries 
that have experienced hyperinflation. 
The results reported in this paper are generally conforming to what has already been 
found. However, it not provides an argument against inflation targeting in developing 
countries. A significant effect on inflation and its volatility was found. Based to the 
results, it seems that inflation target have an important role in reducing inflation rates 
in developing economies.  
The use of the approach of Great Moderation to test the effects of inflation targeting 
in developing countries is one of the first attempts in developing economies. This 
choice is highly beneficial. In addition, the Pétursson (2005) approach is clear and 
intuitive; it used the time dimension of the data with use of panel data. 
We can conclude that the choice of inflation targeting in developing countries has 
helped to reduce inflation. These results are consistent with those of Gonçalves and 
Salles (2006) and Lin, S. and Ye, H.  (2009) and Manai,O. (2014).   
Finally, we conclude that inflation targeting may be desirable for economic reasons 
and it might improve economic performance in the future. Other political and 
institutional factors must be taken into account to judge properly the effect of inflation 
targeting on economic growth in developing market. In this context, we recommend 
preparing an environment of inflation targeting implementation for more economic 
performance. 
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Appendix 
Table A. Country list  
Treatment group Control group 
Brazil                     Poland  
Chile                      Romania 
Colombia               Slovakia 
Czech Republic      South Africa 
Guatemala              South Korea 
Hungary                 Thailand         
Indonesia                Turkey                    
Israel                       Serbia                         
Mexico                    Ghana                   
Peru                        
Philippines 
Algeria           Georgia                  Morocco 
Argentina       Hong kong             Paraguay 
Belarus           Iran                        Russia 
Bulgaria         Jamaica                  Singapore 
Cape Verde     Jordan                  Slovenia  
China              Kazakhstan          Syria  
Costa Rica     Latvia        Trinidad and Tobago 
Croatia            Lebanon               Tunisia  
Dominican Republic    Lithuania    Ukraine 
Egypt              Macedonia            Uruguay 
Estonia            Mauritius              Venezuela 
  
 
 Source: Lin and Ye (2009) and Roger (2009). Serbia and Ghana are two countries are absent in 
Lin and Ye 2009's sample.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B. Developing inflation targeters along with their starting dates 
 Soft IT: Default starting 
dates 
Full Fledged IT: 
Conservative starting 
dates 
Chile   
Israel   
Czech Republic   
South Korea   
Poland   
Mexico   
Brazil   
Colombia   
Philippines   
South Africa   
Thailand   
Hungary   
Peru   
Slovakia   
Guatemala   
Indonesia   
Romania   
Turkey   
Serbia   
Ghana   
 
 
 
 January 1991   
 January 1992   
 January 1998   
 April 1998   
 September 1998   
 January 1999   
 June 1999   
 September 1999   
 January 2002   
 February 2000   
 May 2000   
 June 2001   
 January 2002   
 January 2005   
 January 2005   
 July 2005   
 August 2005   
 January 2006   
 September 2006   
 January 2007   
 August 1999  
 June 1997  
 January 1998  
 April 1998  
 September 1998  
 January 2001  
 June 1999  
 October 1999  
 January 2002  
 February 2000  
 May 2000  
 August 2001  
 January 2002  
 January 2005  
 January 2005  
 July 2005  
 August 2005  
 January 2006  
 September 2006  
 January 2007 
 Source: Rose (2007) and Roger (2009). Note that Slovakia abandoned IT in 2009 
and joined the Euro Area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
